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CHEVRON STEP TWO’S DOMAIN
Kent Barnett* & Christopher J. Walker**
An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or
narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate
centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts
ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution
of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in
the circuit courts, this Article explores how circuit courts have applied Chevron step two to
invalidate agency statutory interpretations. In doing so, it identifies three separate approaches
that merit further theoretical and doctrinal development: (1) a more-searching textualist or structuralist inquiry into the statutory ambiguity in light of the whole statute; (2) an enhanced
purposivist or contextualist inquiry; and (3) an inquiry into an agency’s reasoned decisionmaking similar to arbitrary-and-capricious review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
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INTRODUCTION
Calls within Congress, the legal academy, and the federal judiciary to
eliminate or otherwise narrow judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law have grown in number and volume within recent years.1 The
canonical Chevron deference “two-step”—enunciated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.—requires courts to defer to federal
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions they
administer.2 In the first step, courts assess whether the statutory provision at
issue has a clear meaning.3 If it does, that meaning controls.4 If, however,
the statute is ambiguous, courts proceed to the second step and assess
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.5
Since its inception in 1984, Chevron’s domain has grown more complicated.6 At a preliminary step, called “step zero,” courts decide whether to
engage in the Chevron two-step at all by asking whether Congress intended to
delegate interpretive primacy to agencies instead of courts.7 The current
debate on step zero focuses on the major questions doctrine as articulated by
Chief Justice Roberts for the Court in King v. Burwell, under which courts do
not apply Chevron deference to statutory interpretations that implicate
“major questions.”8 Moreover, circuit courts have added additional wrinkles.
For instance, some courts ask whether the agency understood itself as interpreting an ambiguous statute9 or whether the agency seeks Chevron defer1 See generally Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature
Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018) (reviewing recent criticisms).
2 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
3 See id. at 842.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001) (exploring a number of ways in which Chevron deference has been further
complicated and flagging outstanding questions regarding its domain).
7 For more on Chevron step zero, see id. at 836–37; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–11 (2006). For a recent review of the literature and caselaw
on the scope of Chevron deference under step zero, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J.
Walker, Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
475, 477–84 (2014). One of us has explored which considerations at step zero evidence
congressional intent to delegate. See generally Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (2015).
8 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2491, 2494 (2015). See generally Kent Barnett &
Christopher J. Walker, Response, Short-Circuiting the New Major Questions Doctrine, 70 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 147 (2017) (defending the use of the major questions doctrine in the
federal courts of appeals). One of us has argued that King v. Burwell is not just about major
questions but, instead, part of Chief Justice Roberts’s larger agenda to narrow Chevron
deference. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron Doctrine, 81
MO. L. REV. 1095, 1098–1105 (2016).
9 See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 757 (2017).
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ence at step zero.10 Others assess, after completing Chevron’s two steps,
whether the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).11
More recently, there have been calls to eschew nuance and abandon
Chevron deference altogether. For instance, both the House and the Senate
have introduced legislation to amend the APA to require courts to review de
novo all agency interpretations of statutes and regulations.12 Justice Thomas
has expressed constitutional questions about Chevron deference, as have a
number of circuit judges.13 In 2017, the Senate confirmed Justice Gorsuch
to the Supreme Court, who as a circuit judge expressly questioned Chevron
deference.14
Lost in the debates regarding Chevron’s future, however, is Chevron step
two—the reasonableness inquiry—in affecting agency discretion. When contemplating Chevron’s domain or its very existence, scholars have largely concentrated on how many steps Chevron has15 or how step one should or does
10 See Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 407–08 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“The oddity here,
however, is that the agency no longer seeks deference . . . . In these circumstances, it
would make no sense for this court to determine whether the disputed agency positions
advanced in the Order warrant Chevron deference when the agency has abandoned those
positions.”).
11 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1253, 1254 (1997).
12 See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. § 2
(2016); Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, S. 2724, 114th Cong. § 2 (2016); see
also Christopher Walker, Courts Regulating the Regulators, REG. REV. (Apr. 25, 2016), https://
www.theregreview.org/2016/04/25/walker-courts-regulating-the-regulators/ (explaining
how legislation is an outgrowth of recent Supreme Court criticism of Chevron deference).
13 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring) (“An
Article III renaissance is emerging against the judicial abdication performed in Chevron’s
name.”); Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing both Chevron and Auer); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,
834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (announcing that “[m]aybe
the time has come to face the behemoth” that is Chevron deference); Brett M. Kavanaugh,
Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150–54 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A.
KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (expressing concerns with Chevron deference).
14 See Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Questions Gorsuch on
Holding Federal Bureaucracy Accountable to the Law (Mar. 23, 2017), http://
www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=releases&id=4A30B354-85E8-4726-A5D2-61D
282AF10EB (quoting and linking to relevant Senate Judiciary Committee hearing
testimony).
15 Some argue that Chevron has only one step. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian
Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, Essay, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing that courts
should simply review for reasonable interpretations). The Supreme Court has sometimes
applied a Chevron one-step. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4
(2009); see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 493 n.1
(2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But others argue
that Article III requires two distinct steps, where the first one considers statutory textual
limits on agency discretion. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL403.txt

1444

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

30-MAY-18

14:53

[vol. 93:4

operate.16 Given the received wisdom that agencies nearly always prevail at
step two,17 the second step has largely seemed like a fait accompli, rarely worthy of significant study.18 More recently, however, then-D.C. Circuit Judge
Brown bemoaned the trend toward a one-step examination, arguing that
“[t]runcating the Chevron two-step into a one-step ‘reasonableness’ inquiry
lets the judiciary leave its statutory escort to blow on an agency’s dice.”19
Judge Brown’s colleague Judge Silberman has subsequently called for
step two’s “muscular use . . . [to serve as] a barrier to inappropriate administrative adventure.”20 He noted that the Supreme Court had often given
short shrift to step two or appeared to go out of its way to frame its decisions
under step one when step two would have been more appropriate.21 When
properly applied, he argued, “Chevron’s second step can and should be a
meaningful limitation on the ability of administrative agencies to exploit statutory ambiguities, assert farfetched interpretations, and usurp undelegated
policymaking discretion.”22 We suspect other judges and courts will begin to
consider Judge Silberman’s focus on step two’s domain and whether it
should be more vigorous.
This Article—written for the Notre Dame Law Review Symposium, “Administrative Lawmaking in the Twenty-First Century”—responds to Judge Silberman’s call to explore how Chevron step two limits agency discretion. Drawing
on our dataset of every published Chevron decision in the circuit courts from
2003 through 2013, we find that agencies prevail under the Chevron framework 77.4% of the time. If the court gets to Chevron’s second step, moreover,
the agency-win rate rises to 93.8%, compared to a 39.0% win rate for cases
Steps, Essay, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 612 (2009); see also Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 538–39
(Brown, J., concurring).
16 See, e.g., Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: a Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court has moved, with
some inconsistency from various Justices, from an intentionalist to a textualist inquiry at
step one); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 85 n.9 (1994) (listing scholarship that considers the appropriate tools of statutory interpretation at step one).
17 See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 16, at 100 (“At step two, courts almost never overturn agency interpretations as unreasonable.”).
18 But see Levin, supra note 11 at 1254 (arguing that step two and the APA’s arbitraryand-capricious review should be understood as the same inquiry); Seidenfeld, supra note
16 (arguing that courts should take a more intensive inquiry into the agency’s decisionmaking process at step two).
19 See Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 539 (Brown, J., concurring).
20 Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J.,
concurring).
21 See id. at 418–19 (citing, in particular, Justice Scalia’s analysis in MCI Telecomm. Corp.
v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994)). Judge Silberman’s call for a more vigorous step
two echoes Mark Seidenfeld’s proposal for a “syncopated” Chevron. See Seidenfeld, supra
note 16.
22 Global Tel*Link, 866 F.3d at 418 (Silberman, J., concurring).
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decided at step one.23 In other words, only fifty-one of the 1158 agency statutory interpretations in our eleven-year dataset were invalidated by circuit
courts at step two, confirming longstanding intuitions that step one plays the
predominant constraining role.24 These fifty-one agency losses, however,
shed important empirical light on how Chevron step two actually operates to
serve as a constraint on agency discretion.
As further detailed in Part II, our findings provide significant insight on
how the circuit courts understand step two. We coded the courts’ analysis of
the fifty-one agency losses at step two for about thirty potentially relevant
variables. The most cited variable was the statutory text (72.5% of the time),
followed by the agencies’ lack of reasoned decisionmaking (54.9%), and statutory purpose (47.1%). Other relatively popular practices included reading
the statute as a whole (21.6%), reading the statute with other related statutes
(15.7%), and considering whether the agency had changed its position
(15.7%). When we categorized the fifty-one agency losses under three leading theories of how step two should operate, no one theory commanded a
majority. Indeed, we were unable to categorize approximately 28% of them.
For the remaining interpretations, courts rejected 33.3% of the fifty-one
agency interpretations at step two under a review similar to the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious review, 27.5% under what we refer to as a
“hyperpurposivist” inquiry, and 11.8% under what we categorize as a
“hypertextualist” approach.
These findings have significant implications for how the Supreme Court,
circuit courts, litigants, and scholars should approach Chevron step two going
forward. As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court has not articulated a
coherent approach to step two—originally suggesting some sort of hypertextualist inquiry but, increasingly, suggesting that step two includes an APA-like
arbitrary-and-capricious review. The circuit courts, by contrast, have generally not embraced a hypertextualist inquiry when striking down agency statutory interpretations at step two. Instead, like the Supreme Court, many
circuit courts have applied arbitrary-and-capricious review; others have
embraced a more purposivist inquiry into congressional intent. The latter is
largely absent from the Supreme Court’s guidance on step two. That may
well be due to the late-Justice Scalia’s textualist influence on the Court. Perhaps after his passing, we will see an even greater interest on the Court in
purposivism—or at least some version of contextualism—as an approach to
statutory interpretation.25 If so, such an approach may well find its way into
23 Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 35 fig.3 (2017).
24 See id. at 32–34.
25 See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice A Tax Lawyer?,
2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 35, 37 (noting that “it appears that contextualism is quickly replacing Justice Scalia’s textualism as the foundation for statutory interpretation” on the
Supreme Court, where “contextualism” is “some form of purposivism” that preferences
“legislative substance over form” (internal quotations omitted)).
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Chevron step two, as a means of further constraining agency interpretive
authority.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the Chevron framework
and the competing theories of Chevron step two. Part II describes our study
and reports its findings. Part III discusses the implications of our step-two
findings and calls on the Supreme Court to provide further guidance regarding Chevron step two’s domain—not just to assist lower courts implementing
the Chevron doctrine but also to guide federal agencies in their statutory
interpretation efforts. The Article concludes by calling for more judicial and
scholarly attention to Chevron step two in light of how circuit courts have
approached the issue.
I. THE THEORY

OF

STEP TWO

The Supreme Court has given step two relatively little attention, as compared to steps zero and one. Nonetheless, the Court has rejected an agency’s
statutory interpretation at step two three times, and these three cases provide
some limited guidance. Likewise, scholars have also considered, mostly to a
limited degree, how step two should function. This Part discusses their theories. What follows is not an exhaustive treatment of the Court’s or scholars’
treatment of step two. Instead, it explores what we regard as the most significant analytical models from caselaw or scholarly discourse for step two.
A. Establishing the Chevron Doctrine
At issue in Chevron were the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.
They imposed certain requirements on states that had not achieved the
EPA’s national air-quality standards. The Act required these states to establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources
of air pollution.”26 The EPA’s regulations allowed states to adopt a plantwide definition of the term “stationary source.”27 Under this definition, an
existing plant that contained several pollution-emitting devices could install
or modify one piece of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if
the alteration would not increase the total emissions from the plant.28 In
other words, the plant’s various pollution-emitting devices were viewed as
under a “bubble.”29 The challengers argued that the EPA’s “bubble” concept was contrary to the statute because, they argued, “stationary source”
included either a plant or any of its components that emitted more than a
certain threshold of pollutant.30 The Court upheld the EPA’s
interpretation.31
26
27
28
29
30
31

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 859.
See id. at 866.
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The Court stated that because it was reviewing an agency’s construction
of a statute it administered, it had to follow two steps.32 The first step was to
investigate, using “traditional tools of statutory construction,”33 whether Congress had directly spoken to the precise issue at question. If such intent was
clear regarding the precise issue, then both the Court and the agency had to
follow it.34 However, if Congress had not spoken to the issue, then the Court
itself could not impose its own construction.35 Instead, the Court had to
consider whether the agency’s interpretation, in the face of a statute’s
express delegation or silence, was “permissible.”36
Applying these two steps, the Court first noted that the Clean Air Act
amendments did not explicitly define what Congress intended by a “stationary source.”37 Similarly, the Court found little guidance in the history of the
Clean Air Act’s enactment, an interpretive ruling from 1976, or the legislative
history of the 1977 amendments to the Act.38 Because Congress’s intent was
not clear, the Court moved to step two. Quoting one of its earlier decisions,
the Court deemed the EPA’s “bubble” concept “a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies.”39 The EPA was entitled to deference based on
the “technical and complex” regulatory scheme and the Agency’s “detailed
and reasoned” consideration.40 In reversing the judgment of the court of
appeals, the Court held that the Agency’s interpretation was reasonable.41
The Court emphasized that federal judges must respect the policy-making
space within statutory ambiguities or silence by which Congress has delegated
experts to fill.42
The Court provided little guidance on how to proceed through the various steps. As for what would become “step zero,” the Court indicated that
the Chevron two-step approach applies capaciously to any “agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.”43 For step one, the Court repeatedly
said that it was inquiring into congressional intent,44 but it provided little
guidance on how courts should ascertain congressional intent, except to say
that courts should use “traditional tools of statutory construction.”45 That
said, the Court itself looked at statutory text, the development of the statute,
legislative history, and the purposes of the statute.46
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

See id. at 842.
Id. at 843 n.9.
See id. at 842.
See id. at 844.
Id. at 842–43.
See id. at 859.
See id. at 845–64.
Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).
Id. at 865.
Id. at 845.
See id. at 865–66.
Id. at 842.
See, e.g., id. at 842, 843 n.9, 845, 861.
See id. at 843 n.9.
Id. at 859–66.
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For step two, it clarified that a “permissible” interpretation was a “reasonable” one.47 The Court underscored that at step two the reviewing “court
need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding.”48 And it indicated that a reasonable interpretation was one
that sought to accommodate competing interests and arose from reasoned
consideration.49 Notably, the Court’s analysis in step two considered the
interests that the statute sought to further, the complexity of the statutory
scheme, the agency’s interpretive process, and the agency’s policy-laden
enterprise.50
B. Developing Step Two’s Domain
Despite numerous decisions that provide some guidance on step one,51
the Court has rarely provided significant guidance on step two. Indeed, it
has only rejected agency statutory interpretations at step two three times. We
first turn to these three instances because they provide relatively significant
guidance from the Supreme Court on how it conceptualizes the judicial
inquiry under step two. Nonetheless, as we describe later in this Part, the
Court has sent additional, potentially conflicting signals, in other decisions.
First, in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 restructured local telephone markets to end local telephone-carrier
monopolies and facilitate competition.52 To that end, the Act required
established carriers to share their network facilities with new competitors
under what was known as the “necessary and impair” standard.53 Established
carriers complained that the FCC’s interpretation of this standard read the
limitation out of the statute by essentially requiring established carriers to
share their facilities in all cases.54
The Court agreed with the challengers and deemed the FCC’s interpretation unreasonable.55 The Court engaged in no step-one analysis and did
not even expressly refer to statutory ambiguity.56 Nonetheless, the Court’s
analysis of the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation was textual
47 Id. at 843, 845.
48 Id. at 843 n.11.
49 See id. at 865.
50 Id. at 859–66.
51 See generally Jellum, supra note 16, for a thorough discussion of the Court’s and
various Justices’ disputes over the “traditional tools of statutory construction” that apply at
step one.
52 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999).
53 Id. at 391–92 (internal quotations omitted).
54 See id. at 387–88.
55 See id. at 388–89. The end of the Court’s opinion clarified that it was considering
the reasonableness of the FCC’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions. See id. at
397.
56 See id. 386–92.
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because it chastised the Agency for misreading the statute.57 The FCC had
understood Congress to intend established carriers “to provide all network elements for which it is technically feasible to provide access,”58 although the statute
only required carriers to permit access “at any technically feasible point.”59
In other words, the statute indicated where access was to occur, while the
FCC’s interpretation indicated which elements had to be shared.60 But aside
from this textual inquiry, the Court provided little guidance on step two,
other than to indicate that it had some bite.
Second, fifteen years later, the Court struck down the EPA’s greenhousegas permitting standards in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.61 The Court
began under Chevron step one by holding that, contrary to the Agency’s interpretation, the Clean Air Act did not compel the Agency to regulate all “air
pollutants,” such as greenhouse gasses.62 Although the Court pointed to
prior, contrary EPA positions, it engaged at step one in a purely textual and
structural inquiry that considered various other provisions of the relevant
statute.63
The Court then turned to step two and provided some gloss on how to
review for reasonableness. The agency’s interpretation had to “account for
both ‘the specific context in which . . . language is used’ and ‘the broader
context of the statute as a whole.’ ”64 The Court determined that the EPA’s
interpretation concerning certain permitting requirements under the Clean
Air Act was “inconsistent with—in fact, would overthrow—the Act’s structure
and design.”65 (Relatedly, when holding that a separate regulatory action
concerning “best available control technology” for limiting greenhouse-gas
pollutants was reasonable under the same statute, the Court again relied on
“statutory context.”)66 The Agency’s interpretation as to permitting would
also have led to an “unprecedented expansion of EPA authority that would
have a profound effect on virtually every sector of the economy and touch
every household in the land.”67
57 Id. at 391–92.
58 Id. at 391 (quoting In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecomm. Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15499, ¶ 278 (1966)).
59 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)).
60 Id.
61 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
62 See id. at 2439–42.
63 See id. at 2440–42.
64 Id. at 2442 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). The
Robinson Court did not engage in a Chevron inquiry, and the quoted language arose in the
context of determining whether the statutory language was plain or ambiguous, although
the Court referred to “broader context” in resolving the meaning of an ambiguous statutory term. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language
is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”).
65 Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442.
66 Id. at 2447–48.
67 Id. at 2436 (quoting Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air
Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44355 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1)).
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Notably, the Court cited its decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. when rejecting the EPA’s interpretation at step two.68 The
Court refused to permit agencies to acquire newly discovered authority to
require permits “in a long-extant statute . . . [over] ‘a significant portion of
the American economy.’ ”69 The Court in Brown & Williamson had refused,
within step one, to permit the FDA to regulate tobacco because the Court did
not think Congress would delegate “a decision of such economic and political significance to [the FDA] in so cryptic a fashion.”70 In Utility Air Regulatory Group, the Court expanded the domain of the same principle—what is
commonly known as the “major questions doctrine”—to step two when
rejecting an agency’s statutory interpretation.
Third in our trilogy is Michigan v. EPA.71 Relying on both arbitrary-andcapricious review under the APA and Chevron step two, the Court in Michigan
v. EPA rejected the EPA’s refusal to consider costs when regulating certain air
pollutants.72 The Clean Air Act directed the EPA to regulate power plants’
air pollutants as “appropriate and necessary.”73 The EPA interpreted the
phrase to mean that the Agency could not consider costs.74
After citing its decisions concerning arbitrary-and-capricious review, the
Court cited Chevron and held that the Agency’s interpretation was unreasonable (without engaging in any step-one analysis).75 The Court, similar to its
reasoning in Iowa Utilities Board,76 contrasted the “appropriate and necessary”
provision with other provisions within the Act,77 and it referred to “the backdrop of . . . established administrative practice” of considering costs in regulation.78 In rejecting the Agency’s counterarguments, the Court also
considered its prior precedent under the Clean Air Act,79 additional textual
arguments,80 and a limited purposivist inquiry into why Congress treated
power plants differently from other pollution emitters.81 Notably, in the
middle of its Chevron analysis, the Court referred to Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., one of
its most significant arbitrary-and-capricious decisions.82
68 Id. at 2443.
69 Id. at 2444 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159
(2000)).
70 Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 160.
71 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2704.
74 See id. at 2704–06.
75 See id. at 2706–07.
76 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
77 See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707–08.
78 Id. at 2708.
79 See id. at 2709.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 2709–10.
82 See id. at 2706 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)).
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Because the Court has spent so little time on how to approach step two
in the context of rejecting an agency’s interpretation,83 we consider here
three possible analytical methods that either caselaw (including additional
guidance from the Court) or scholars have suggested.
1. Hypertextualism and Structuralism
The first is what we refer to as “hypertextualism” or “structuralism.” By
this we mean a judicial inquiry at step two that focuses significantly on the
text of the statute and its meaning within the statute as a whole and in other
related statutes. Courts may refer to canons of statutory interpretation or,
similar to Ronald Levin’s characterization, “belatedly discover[ ] clear meaning” that is contrary to the agency’s interpretation at step two through various interpretive methods.84 Courts do not engage in hypertextualism or
structuralism by simply referring to statutory text to guide their inquiry in
passing or in concert with other more significant interpretive methods.
Instead, their analysis provides a focused inquiry on the text or structure of
the statute, a collection of related statutes, or both. In short, hypertextualism
or structuralism is merely a continuation of a textualist-based step one,
except that its focus (in theory) is on the reasonableness of the interpretation, not whether statutory ambiguity exists.
The Supreme Court’s analysis may be best thought of as engaging in
hypertextualism or structuralism. In Iowa Utilities Board, the Court narrowly
focused on the language of related statutory provisions at issue by considering how the Commission’s misreading of a provision concerning feasibility
affected its regulation of network-element sharing under the “necessary and
impair” standard.85 Likewise, in Utility Air Regulatory Group, the Court
83 The Supreme Court’s 4-1-4 decision in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006),
might be another case that involves step two. But it is difficult to categorize and does not
shed much light on Chevron step two’s domain. First, the Court’s plurality arguably framed
its analysis as a step-one discussion. Compare id. at 731–32 (plurality opinion) (noting that
the “only natural definition of the term ‘waters’ . . . cannot bear the expansive meaning the
Corps would give it”), and id. at 738 (providing an alternative argument that “[e]ven if the
term ‘the waters of the United States’ were ambiguous” as to intermittent and ephemeral
water flows), with id. at 739 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)) (stating that the Agency’s interpretation was not “based on a
permissible construction of the statute”). Nonetheless, the Chief Justice (one of the plurality’s members) curiously suggested in a separate concurring opinion that the Agency may
have rulemaking authority to delineate the reach of a “somewhat ambiguous” statute. Id.
at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion, concurring in
the judgment, may be best described as providing analysis based on some hybrid of Chevron
step two and the Court’s “significant nexus” standard from an earlier Court decision. See
id. at 759, 766, 778 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). He argued that the court of
appeals, on remand, should consider the proper factors under the Court’s “significant
nexus” test. See id. at 759, 783–87. The four dissenting justices would have deferred to the
Agency under Chevron step two. See id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Levin, supra note 11, at 1283.
85 See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 387–88 (1999).
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focused on the disputed language’s context within the statute as a whole and
the statute’s permitting-process design. Indeed, the Court did so in both
rejecting one of the EPA’s statutory interpretations and upholding
another.86 Finally, the Court relied primarily on textual arguments—by comparing the “appropriate and necessary” standard with other provisions of the
relevant act—in rejecting the EPA’s interpretation in Michigan v. EPA.87
Perhaps the most obvious concern with a hypertextual or structural step
two is that it appears to render step two largely redundant. As Linda Jellum
has argued, the Court, despite inconsistency with the Chevron decision itself,
has transitioned to a textualist, as opposed to an intentionalist, inquiry at step
one.88 If that is so, then it is difficult to see how a similar or more expansive
textual or structural inquiry at step two adds much to the inquiry. In fact, as
Utility Air Regulatory Group indicates, the Court’s step-one analysis, although
largely relying on prior agency positions, included a significant discussion of
the statute’s various provisions when rejecting the EPA’s argument that the
statute compelled the Agency’s broad interpretation of “air pollutant.”89
And, to further intermingle the two steps, the Court imported the major
questions doctrine that it had earlier used as part of step one to step two.
That said, the Supreme Court’s reliance on the major questions doctrine
may give step two a raison d’être by moving beyond textual inquiries into a
broader search for congressional intent. By considering whether the
Agency’s interpretation would present a major question of economic or political significance in Utility Air Regulatory Group, the Court was looking past the
statutory text.90 Instead, it sought to glean whether Congress, despite its
silence, would have intended for the EPA to require permitting in a capacious manner.91 But this intentionalist framing for step two is not without its
complications. Step two would become merely an extended inquiry into
whether the agency’s interpretation is contrary to congressional intent, precisely Chevron’s stated step-one purpose. By focusing on congressional intent,
step two would not address the reasonableness of an interpretation when
Congress’s intent is not clear.
2. Hyperpurposivism
Instead of extended textual or structural approaches at step two, courts
could engage in an extended inquiry into the purpose of the statute—what
we call “hyperpurposivism.” The benefit of this analytical method is that it
creates a separate space for step two if a textual inquiry, as has increasingly
occurred, subsumes step one. If Congress’s intent was not clear (as determined at step one), comparing the agency’s interpretation with the purpose
86
87
88
89
90
91

See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014).
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708 (2015).
See Jellum, supra note 16, at 729.
Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2440–42.
See id. at 2444.
See id.
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of the statute or statutory scheme provides a relatively predictable and familiar way of assessing reasonableness in the void of ambiguity. The Court, to a
limited extent, relied on purposivism (by considering why Congress treated
power plants differently than other polluting sources) in rejecting the EPA’s
interpretation in Michigan v. EPA.92 Moreover, focusing on the statute’s purpose recognizes Congress’s inability to express its intent as to myriad factual
circumstances that its members could never envision when enacting legislation.93 Finally, purposivism is a familiar tool for statutory interpretation that
is appropriate for Chevron because Chevron is limited to agency statutory
interpretation.94 Indeed, there is a burgeoning literature that has called for
a more purposivist approach to agency statutory interpretation (than to judicial statutory interpretation) based on the comparative institutional
expertise.95
Mark Seidenfeld has argued that step two should have a more pronounced role than step one—what he refers to as a “syncopated Chevron.”96
Because Congress often fails to (or cannot) expressly state its intent as to all
matters, judges with a textual inquiry in step one may mistakenly incorporate
their policy preferences under the guise of ascertaining “plain meaning.”97
Courts should, instead, be humble at step one and engage in a more thorough review at step two. Courts should ensure at step two that the agency,
when acting within statutory ambiguity, has considered the statute’s purpose
and, often with legislative history in hand, the various interest groups’ or
legislators’ policy preferences at issue when Congress enacted the legislation.98 This focus on whether the agency has considered the many and, oftentimes, conflicting interests is consistent with Chevron itself. The Chevron
Court held that the EPA’s interpretation was reasonable in part because it
“represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests” and “reconcil[ed] conflicting policies.”99
But a purposivist inquiry has its downsides. For one, it is far from clear
that step one should exclude a purposivist inquiry. After all, Chevron itself
instructed courts to apply “traditional tools of statutory construction”100 and
used purposivism as part of its step-one inquiry.101 (And for the ardent tex92 Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2710.
93 See Seidenfeld, supra note 16, at 111–24.
94 See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52–53 n.7 (2011) (refusing to apply Chevron to agency decision because it concerned policy, not statutory interpretation).
95 See Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377,
1398–401 (2017) (reviewing literature and discussing some empirical support for
position).
96 See Seidenfeld, supra note 16, at 87.
97 See id. at 119–21.
98 See id. at 129–30, 134.
99 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
100 Id. at 843 n.9.
101 See id. at 851–53 (“[Legislative history] does, however, plainly disclose that in the
permit program Congress sought to accommodate the conflict between the economic
interest in permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental interest in
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tualists who reject a purposivist inquiry generally, it is not clear why they
would reject it at step one yet use it at step two.) Second, Seidenfeld’s call for
agencies to consider policies and for courts to assess the agencies’ reasoning
process102 sounds in the reasoned decisionmaking inquiry of “hard look”
arbitrary-and-capricious review under the APA for policy decisions.103 To the
extent that it does so, a capacious purposivist approach risks having step two
lose any independent purpose and become some flavor of arbitrary-andcapricious review. Indeed, Seidenfeld recognizes that his proposed version
of step two would be “something akin to hard look review.”104 That said,
Chevron itself deferred to the EPA in part because “the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion,”105 suggesting that step two may
not be hermetically sealed from arbitrary-and-capricious review under the
APA.
3. Arbitrary-and-Capricious Review
Although others have noted the similarity between step two and arbitrary-and-capricious review,106 Ronald Levin has perhaps most thoroughly
developed the argument. Going further than Seidenfeld’s proposal for step
two to be akin to arbitrary review,107 Levin argues that courts should allow
the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious review to “absorb[ ]” step two.108 Levin
argues that step two does little work.109 An agency’s interpretation will only
make it past step one if it is not clearly contrary to congressional intent.110
Once it makes it past step one, it does not, by definition, contravene congressional intent.111 Courts could address concerns over an agency’s failure to
provide reasons or to account for various factors (such as inconsistent provisions, irrational action within a broader administrative framework, etc.)
under run-of-the-mill arbitrariness review.112
improving air quality. Indeed, the House Committee Report identified the economic
interest as one of the ‘two main purposes’ of this section of the bill.”).
102 See Seidenfeld, supra note 16, at 128–30.
103 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
104 See Seidenfeld, supra note 16, at 129.
105 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
106 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2105 (1990) (“The reasonableness inquiry should probably be seen as similar to the
inquiry into whether the agency’s decision is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ within the meaning
of the APA.”); accord Laurence H. Silberman, Foreword: Chevron—The Intersection of Law &
Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 827–28 (1990).
107 Seidenfeld, supra note 16, at 129. Seidenfeld, however, contended that arbitraryand-capricious review would have a separate space from step two. See id.
108 Levin, supra note 11, at 1255.
109 See id. at 1254–55.
110 See id. at 1261.
111 See id. at 1254.
112 See id. at 1294.
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More recently, Catherine Sharkey has proposed a similar understanding
of step two, except that she proposes to incorporate a stricter formulation of
arbitrary-and-capricious review—known as “hard-look review”—into step two
to ensure that agencies engage in reasoned decisionmaking.113 One key
benefit of the arbitrary-and-capricious approach—whether “soft glance”114 or
“hard look”—is that it potentially reconciles Chevron’s two steps and the
APA’s judicial-review provisions: step one permits the courts to review questions of law de novo as required under § 706 of the APA, while step two (in
the absence of any clear law to apply) permits courts to review for arbitrary
agency action under § 706(a)(2)(A).115
Indeed, the Supreme Court may have held as much in decisions between
Iowa Utilities Board and Utility Air Regulatory Group. In United States v. Mead
Corp., the Court quoted the APA’s arbitrary-review provision immediately
after describing Chevron step two.116 More recently, Justice Kagan, writing
for a unanimous Court in 2011, appeared to confirm Mead’s suggestion in
Judulang v. Holder.117 In that decision, the Court reviewed the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ decision concerning certain deportations under arbitrary-and-capricious review.118 The Government had argued that the Court
should use Chevron step two in its analysis, but the Court held that Chevron
did not apply because the Agency decision was one of policy, not statutory
interpretation.119 Nonetheless, the Court said, quoting another then-recent
unanimous decision (Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v.
United States): “Were we to [use Chevron step two], our analysis would be the
same, because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is ‘arbitrary or capricious in substance.’ ”120 Relatedly, the Mayo Court’s
step-two analysis seemed as far-reaching as typical arbitrary-and-capricious
review. The Mayo Court reviewed the IRS’s interpretation of “students” as
excluding medical residents.121 In deferring to the Agency at step two, the
Court evaluated the IRS’s reasoned decisionmaking that considered, among
other things, sensible line drawing for who qualifies as a “student” and the
purposes of related statutory schemes.122 And, as we saw in Michigan v. EPA,
the Court mixed step two and arbitrary-and-capricious review.123
113 See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3092742.
114 E.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1411 (2010) (mentioning “soft glance” review).
115 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
116 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
117 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
118 See id. at 45–53.
119 See id. at 52–53 n.7.
120 See id. at 52 n.7 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States,
562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)).
121 See Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 47.
122 See id. at 58–60.
123 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015).
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But even more recently, the Supreme Court has sent mixed signals. In
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, the Court refused to apply Chevron deference to a Department of Labor regulation that interpreted automobile-service advisors as eligible for overtime pay.124 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy stated that Chevron did not apply to “procedurally defective” regulations, including those for which the agency failed to “give adequate reasons
for its decisions.”125 The Court expressly cited the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard under § 706 of the APA and the Court’s precedents related to that
standard.126 The Court was not clear as to whether this arbitrary-and-capricious review for lack of reasoned decisionmaking was part of, or separate
from, Chevron’s two steps.
If arbitrary review and step two converge, this convergence requires, as
Levin recognizes, some adjustment to what appears to be the Supreme
Court’s step-one analysis.127 Currently, the Court is inclined to engage in
only a textual inquiry at step one.128 If step one will become the domain of
all statutory interpretation issues and arbitrary-and-capricious review will concentrate on process and reasoned decisionmaking, then step one must
include all tools of statutory interpretation, including nontextualist tools of
statutory construction. Until the Court does so, the convergence of step two
with arbitrary-and-capricious review will leave purposivism (and other
nontextualist tools) out of judicial review of agency statutory interpretation.
Again, for strong textualists, perhaps no step-one reform is required. But the
majority of the current Court applies purposivist tools to some extent.
Others, including Gary Lawson, have argued that courts should not collapse step two into arbitrary-and-capricious review.129 Lawson argues that
Chevron step two and APA arbitrary-and-capricious review have different
objectives.130 The former assesses the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation without regard to how the agency reached its interpretive outcome.131 The latter assesses the agency’s decisionmaking process to ensure
that the agency did not reach its reasonable outcome in an arbitrary fashion
(such as by placing several reasonable interpretations in a hat and pulling
one out).132 Moreover, Lawson argues that the tools for each inquiry are
different. The former uses various statutory interpretation tools in interpreting the statute at issue, including legislative history, purpose, text, and structure.133 The latter is a broader review that considers “anything that is
124 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016).
125 Id. at 2125.
126 See id. at 2125–26.
127 See Levin, supra note 11, at 1266–71.
128 See Jellum, supra note 16, at 770.
129 See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal
Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313 (1996).
130 Id. at 327.
131 Id. at 326.
132 Id. at 326–27.
133 See id. at 339.
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generally relevant to reasoned decisionmaking.”134 Because Lawson sees a
narrower, but particular, role for step two as compared to arbitrary-and-capricious review, his inquiry would be consistent with a textual and limited
purposivist inquiry for step two.
* * *
In sum, over the three decades since the Chevron decision itself, the
Supreme Court has only rarely taken the opportunity to expound on Chevron
step two’s domain. And when it has done so, the Court’s guidance has been
inconsistent and at times in tension. Figure 1 summarizes the Court’s key
Chevron step-two precedents.
FIGURE 1.

SUPREME COURT STEP-TWO APPROACHES

Year Decision
135

1984 Chevron

136

1999 Iowa Utilities Board
137
2001 Mead
138

2011 Mayo Foundation
139
2011 Judulang
140
2014 Utility Air Regulatory Group
141
2015 Michigan v. EPA
142

2016 Encino Motorcars

II. STEP TWO

Approach
Agency’s reasoned consideration of
purpose and policies (arbitrary review?)
Hypertextualism
Arbitrary review
Arbitrary review
Arbitrary review
Hypertextualism
Hypertextualism, arbitrary review
Unclear: separate arbitrary review?
IN THE

CIRCUIT COURTS

As discussed in Part I and depicted in Figure 1, the Supreme Court has
provided little guidance, much less consistent guidance, as to Chevron step
two’s domain. Indeed, as Bill Eskridge and Lauren Baer have explored, the
Court from 1984 to 2006 applied Chevron deference inconsistently—only
about a quarter of the time that it should have.143 Perhaps the federal courts
134 See id. at 340.
135 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
136 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
137 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
138 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
139 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011).
140 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
141 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
142 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
143 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1124–25 (2008); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 982 (1992) (“[I]t is clear that Chevron is often ignored by the Supreme Court. . . .
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of appeals, which apply Chevron on a much more regular basis, are a better
source for understanding Chevron step two’s domain.
To understand how the circuit courts approach Chevron deference, we
analyzed every published circuit court decision that referred to Chevron from
2003 through 2013. We have explored our findings at length elsewhere.144
In this Article, we focus on how the circuit courts have applied step two.
Section II.A briefly outlines the study design and dataset. Section II.B provides an overview of our general findings as to Chevron’s application in the
circuit courts. Section II.C then takes a closer look at the cases in which the
agency lost at step two to get a better sense of the various approaches to step
two’s domain.
A. The Study Design and Data Set
Our database of 2272 judicial decisions, collected with broad search
parameters, includes all published decisions from the circuit courts over an
eleven-year period (2003–2013) that refer to the Chevron doctrine. Within
the relevant 1327 of those collected opinions, we uncovered 1558 instances
of judicial review of an agency statutory interpretation (not merely any kind
of agency action). Largely following Eskridge and Baer’s methodology,145 we
coded each agency statutory interpretation with respect to nearly forty different variables, including: information about the decision (circuit, year, judges,
separate opinions); information about the agency interpretation (the agency,
subject matter, final agency decisionmaker, agency procedure used, and ideological valence of agency’s interpretation); and information about the judicial outcome (outcome as to agency, ideological valence of the decision,
standard of review applied, and factors that influenced the court’s decision).146 Our coding and analysis process are described in greater detail in
Chevron in the Circuit Courts.147
To gather supplementary information for this Article, we returned to the
dataset to code about thirty additional variables when the court rejected the
agency’s interpretation at step two. We selected the instances in which the
courts rejected the agency’s interpretation because, based on our review of
all the Chevron circuit-court cases, we thought it was significantly more likely
that the courts would have a more meaningful discussion of step two in those
cases than in cases in which the courts determined that the agency interpre[T]he two-step framework has been used in only about one-third of the total post-Chevron
cases in which one or more Justices recognized that a deference question was presented.”).
144 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 23, at 28–70; see also Kent Barnett, Christina L.
Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3132045; Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd
& Christopher J. Walker, The Politics of Selecting Chevron Deference, 15 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD.
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984302.
145 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 143, at 1093–97.
146 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts: The Codebook
Appendix, 116 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017).
147 Barnett & Walker, supra note 23, at 21–27.
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tation was reasonable. The additional coded variables included which tools
and factors the court mentioned when making the step-two determination as
well as an attempt to categorize the depth and type of step-two analysis. The
variables are further discussed in Section III.C. To conduct this additional
coding, we followed a similar process as for the original coding: a research
assistant conducted the preliminary coding of each case where the agency
lost at step two, and then one of us (Walker) conducted a secondary review of
each case.
As we noted in greater detail in Chevron in the Circuit Courts, there are a
number of significant methodological limitations in our study design.148 In
addition to the standard limitations involved in judicial decisions of varying
clarity and quality, we only looked at circuit court decisions, not district court
decisions; only published decisions, not those where circuit courts declined
to designate for publication; and only decisions that cited or otherwise
referred to Chevron deference.
B. General Findings
As we report in Chevron in the Circuit Courts, our findings suggest that
Chevron deference matters: agency interpretations were significantly more
likely to prevail under Chevron deference (77.4%) than Skidmore deference
(56.0%) or, especially, de novo review (38.5%). Put differently, there was
nearly a twenty-five percentage-point difference in agency-win rates with
Chevron deference (77.4%) than without (53.6%).149 As one would expect,
agency interpretations advanced through more formal procedures were
more likely to prevail in court than those advanced through less formal procedures.150 Somewhat surprisingly, interpretations made in formal adjudication (74.7%) were slightly more successful than those made in notice-andcomment rulemaking (72.8%)—though such differences could also reflect
differences in agency interpretive practices in each of these procedures.151
It is important to note that the agency-win rates varied significantly by
agency and subject matter.152 For instance, the Federal Communications
Commission (82.5% agency-win rate), Treasury Department (78.9%), and,
perhaps surprisingly, National Labor Relations Board (78.1%) were a few of
the big winners among the agencies. By contrast, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (42.9%), Energy Department (45.5%), and
Department of Housing and Urban Development (54.2%) were among the
biggest losers in the circuit courts.153 The findings were similar as to subject
matter.154 Moreover, independent agencies outperformed executive agencies as to overall agency-win rate (77.0% to 70.2%) and frequency of Chevron
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See

id. at 25–27.
id. at 28–32, 30 fig.1.
id. at 35–44.
at 37 fig.4.
id. at 49–56.
id. at 54 tbl.3.
id. at 49–52, 50 tbl.2.
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application (82.5% to 73.2%)—though agency-win rate evened out when
Chevron applied (79.6% to 76.8%).155
We also found significant variation among the circuit courts.156 For
agency-win rates, the First Circuit was the most agency friendly (82.8%),
while the Ninth Circuit was the least agency friendly (65.8%).157 As for Chevron’s application, the D.C. Circuit applied it almost as a matter of course at
88.6% of the time, while the Sixth Circuit applied it only 60.7% of the
time.158 Once Chevron applied though, the agency seemed to prevail as a
matter of course in the Sixth Circuit (88.2% of the time, the highest rate),
while the agency won only 72.3% of the time in the Ninth Circuit, the lowest
rate. The differential between agency-win rates with and without Chevron
indicates that agencies prevailed more in all circuits when Chevron applied.
The most striking was the Sixth Circuit, with its nearly fifty-percentage-point
difference in agency-win rates. Only the Eighth Circuit had a differential that
was less than five percentage points, and the Eleventh Circuit was the only
other circuit with a differential of less than ten percentage points.159 Figure
2 depicts agency-win rates by circuit with and without Chevron.160
FIGURE 2. AGENCY-WIN RATES BY CIRCUIT WITH
DEFERENCE (N=1558)

AND

WITHOUT CHEVRON

For purposes of this Article, we care most about how the circuit courts
applied Chevron. Circuit courts applied Chevron 74.8% of the time in our
155
156
157
158
159
160

See id. at 56–57, 57 fig.10.
See id. at 44–49.
See id. at 44 fig.7.
See id. at 48 fig.9.
See id.
Figure 1 is reproduced from id. at 48 fig.9.
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dataset.161 When Chevron’s two-step approach applied, the circuit courts
resolved the matter at step one (i.e., the step at which the courts ask whether
Congress’s intent was clear) 30.0% of the time, and, of those Chevron stepone decisions, agencies prevailed 39.0% of the time.162 “Consistent with
prior studies, the vast majority of agency interpretations” (70.0%) “made it to
step two.”163 And an even greater percentage of interpretations that made it
to step two (93.8%) were upheld.164 In other words, of the 817 agency statutory interpretations that made it to step two, the agency lost with respect to
only fifty-one of them. To put these numbers in context, Figure 3 depicts
agency-win rates under each deference standard (Chevron, Skidmore, and de
novo review), as well as breaks out separately the agency-win rate at Chevron
steps one and two.165
The conventional wisdom is certainly true: Once a court decides to apply
the Chevron framework, the critical litigation battleground takes place at step
one. If a court finds the statute unambiguous at step one, the agency-win
rate is roughly the same as de novo review (39.0% and 38.5%, respectively).
If the court advances to step two, however, the agency wins almost every time.
But not always. The fifty-one instances in which the agency lost at Chevron
step two are explored in much greater detail in the following Section.

161 Id. at 29.
162 See id. at 33 fig.2.
163 Id. at 33; cf. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 & fig.A (1998) (noting that
out of 253 interpretations, 72.7% were resolved under a “reasonableness” inquiry under a
Chevron analysis with only one step (72 interpretations) or under step two of a two-step
inquiry (112 interpretations)). By contrast, Thomas Merrill found almost the inverse in his
study of Supreme Court decisions from 1984 to 1990—only 44% of Chevron decisions made
it to step two. See Merrill, supra note 143, at 981 tbl.1.
164 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 23, at 33.
165 Figure 2 is reproduced from id. at 35 fig.3. The “no regime selected (n=107)” category refers to those cases where the circuit courts declined to choose a deference standard,
usually holding that the answer would have been the same under any standard.
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FIGURE 3. AGENCY-WIN RATES BY DEFERENCE STANDARD, INCLUDING CHEVRON
STEPS ONE AND TWO (N=1558)

C. Step-Two Findings
Before turning to how the circuits applied Chevron step two when the
agency lost, it is perhaps helpful to describe the set of fifty-one agency statutory interpretations. Although interpretations are spread pretty evenly across
the eleven years in the dataset,166 the same was not true as to agency, circuit,
or subject matter. As for the subject matter, immigration dominated in steptwo losses, with 19 agency statutory interpretations or 37.3% of the total.
This is not too surprising as agency interpretations of immigration statutes
constituted 30.6% of the entire dataset (478 agency interpretations),167 and
agency-win rates in the immigration context were generally lower than in
other regulatory contexts.168 The environmental context had the second166 Among the agency losses at step two, there were 4 interpretations in 2003, 5 in 2004,
8 in 2005, 4 in 2006, 2 in 2007, 7 in 2008, 2 in 2009, 2 in 2010, 7 in 2011, and 7 in 2013.
167 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 23, at 27.
168 See, e.g., id. at 7, 37–40, 45 (breaking out immigration cases from the rest of the
findings).
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most step-two losses (7 agency interpretations or 13.7% of all agency step-two
losses), and no other subject had more than three step-two losses.169 The
breakdown by agency is similar.
With respect to step-two losses by circuit, the D.C. Circuit leads the way
with 19, or 37.3% of the total losses. This is noteworthy, as the D.C. Circuit
makes up only 19.7% (307 of 1558 agency interpretations) of the entire
dataset.170 That said, the D.C. Circuit was also the circuit most likely to apply
the Chevron framework (88.6%), compared to the average (74.8%) and
median (73.2%) circuit.171 The Ninth Circuit is the only other circuit with
more than five step-two agency losses, with 9 or 17.6% of the total losses. The
Ninth Circuit makes up 16.9% (263 of 1558 agency interpretations) of the
entire dataset, the second most after the D.C. Circuit.172 All of the other
circuits have five or fewer agency step-two losses, with the Fourth Circuit having none.173 The Fourth Circuit is remarkable: in eleven years and seventytwo instances of judicial review,174 the Fourth Circuit never invalidated an
agency statutory interpretation at step two.
Before turning to which factors the circuit courts considered at step two,
we briefly note which factors played little to no role.175 Of the twenty-three
factors we coded as potentially relevant at step two, the circuit courts never
mentioned the following in their step-two analysis: (1) the distinct subject
matter, (2) the existence of a major question, (3) the agency’s political
169 There are 216 total agency statutory interpretations in the dataset that are from the
environmental context. The other subject matters with step-two losses are: business regulation (1 loss in 53 total agency interpretations in dataset); civil rights (1 in 12); energy (3 in
50); entitlement programs (3 in 139); federal government (2 in 11); Indian affairs (1 in
15); collective bargaining/labor (3 in 62); tax (1 in 48); telecommunications (3 in 81);
transportation (3 in 43); antidumping/trade (2 in 52); and employment (2 in 84). It is
worth noting that the following subject matters for which there are at least 10 agency statutory interpretations in the dataset had no step-two losses: agriculture (21 total agency interpretations); criminal law (10); education (21); health and safety (47); intellectual property
(27); pensions (17); and prisons (19).
170 See Barnett & Walker, supra note 23, at 49 tbl.1.
171 Id. at 45.
172 Id. at 49 tbl.1.
173 The First (n=58), Second (n=171), Fifth (n=87), Sixth (n=84), and Seventh (n=75)
Circuits all have only one agency step-two loss, whereas the Eleventh Circuit (n=71) has
two, the Eighth Circuit (n=49) has three, the Tenth (n=65) and Federal (n=123) Circuits
have four, and the Third Circuit (n=133) has five. The numbers in parentheses reflect the
total agency statutory interpretations from that circuit in the whole dataset (n=1558). See
id.
174 Id.
175 To be clear, these findings only relate to the circuit courts’ reliance on these factors
at step two. In many instances, courts may have cited these factors as relevant at step zero
or one. See id. at 58–73 & figs.11–14 (discussing these factors in greater detail as to the
other steps). Nonetheless, we reported earlier that courts hardly ever mention certain
factors. See id. at 68 (“The five remaining factors were obscure in circuit-court decisions.
Courts invoked political accountability in 0.5% of all interpretations, public reliance in
0.7%, contemporaneity in 1.9%, national standards in 2.2%, and congressional acquiescence in 3.1%.”).
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accountability, (4) the lack of agency expertise, (5) the importance of
national uniformity of the law, (6) the contemporaneity of the agency interpretation, (7) public reliance on the agency interpretation, (8) the format or
procedures used to promulgate the agency interpretation including (9) the
use of rulemaking, or (10) congressional acquiescence in the agency interpretation. Similarly, only one decision resorted to a dictionary definition176
or a normative canon of statutory construction (there, constitutional avoidance),177 and only two looked to semantic canons.178
So which factors did seem to matter? As depicted in Figure 4, the most
cited factor (72.5%) is reliance on the statutory text. That statutory text is
the big winner should come as no surprise. Indeed, one may reasonably be
surprised that courts do not always return to the text as a starting point for
determining whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is
reasonable, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s textual approach in
Iowa Utility Board.179 The next most cited factor (54.9%) may be surprising
to some: courts’ emphasis on the agency’s lack of reasoned decisionmaking.
The factor usually arose in one of two ways: the court criticized the agency’s
lack of reason giving for its interpretation, or it faulted the agency for not
providing a sufficient reason for deviating from the agency’s earlier statutory
interpretation. The third most cited factor (47.1%) is statutory purpose, followed by the similar purposivist factors of legislative history (27.5%), contrary
to the right “policy” (23.5%), and leading to absurd results (23.5%).
As for other factors, perhaps surprisingly, courts resorted to judicial precedent as a gauge of reasonableness 23.5% of the time.180 Courts also relied
at step two on reading the statute as a whole (21.6%), on reading the statute
in pari materia with related statutes (15.7%), and on the fact that the agency
had changed its statutory interpretation (15.7%).
176 In fact, the court did not even cite a dictionary, but just referred repeatedly to the
“plain meaning” of a statutory term. See Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 391 F.3d
1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2004) (“That the agency’s definition of Plaintiff’s worksite contravenes the plain meaning of the term ‘worksite’ is one indicia of congressional intent that
militates against deference to the agency’s construction of the statute under the second
step of Chevron.”).
177 See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 738 F.3d 885, 900 (8th Cir.
2013) (“Finding no statutory or logical reason to accept CBP’s interpretation of [19
U.S.C.] § 1584(a)(2), we ‘decline to construe the [statute] in a manner that could in turn
call upon [us] to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of
the’ Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.” (second and third alteration in original)
(quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979))).
178 See Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Generally, when Congress includes a specific term in one provision of a statute, but excludes it
in another, it is presumed that the term does not govern the sections in which it is omitted.”); Akhtar v. Burzynski, 384 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004) (expressio unius canon).
179 See supra Section I.B.
180 Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005) (“Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the
agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a
conflicting agency construction.”).
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CHEVRON STEP TWO (N=51)

Circuit court reliance on these factors underscores the prevalence of two
of the three predominant approaches to Chevron step two’s domain: the
hyperpurposivist inquiry and an arbitrary-and-capricious review similar to
that under the APA. The latter approach is similar to what the Supreme
Court has suggested, called for, or applied in, respectively, Mead, Judulang,
and Michigan v. EPA. To a lesser extent, we also see a hypertextualist
approach similar to what the Court largely did in Utility Air Regulatory Group,
Iowa Utilities Board, and Michigan v. EPA. To further flesh out these findings,
we categorized the circuit courts’ overall approach to Chevron step two’s
domain under these three theories based on the main thrust of the court’s
analysis. In other words, if a court primarily relied on hypertextualism but
referred in passing to a purposivist argument, we categorized the interpretation as hypertextualist. We set to one side any cases that were unclear, overly
cursory, or otherwise too difficult to categorize. Figure 5 depicts those findings as to circuit courts’ approaches to step two when agencies lose.
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Chevron Step Two’s Domain

As depicted in Figure 5, one-third (33%) of the step-two cases involve
some form of arbitrary-and-capricious review, whereas 27.5% of the step-two
cases utilize a hyperpurposivist approach. Only a half-dozen cases (11.8%)
embrace a more-searching textualist or structuralist approach (even if courts
frequently make some reference to the statutory text at issue), with the
remainder (27.5%) being unclear, too cursory, or otherwise too difficult to
categorize.
When courts apply the arbitrary-and-capricious approach at Chevron step
two, they usually focus on the quality of (or lack thereof) the agency’s reasoning, with heightened scrutiny when an agency has changed its interpretation
or advanced conflicting interpretations.181 The Third Circuit’s approach in
Castillo v. Attorney General is illustrative: “The [Board of Immigration
Appeals], to date, has offered no attempt to reconcile, reject, or otherwise
explain its inconsistent decisions. In fact, it has not even recognized that
181 See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The problem here is
that the Board’s decision is inconsistent with its decisions in other similar cases.”); Am.
Airlines, Inc v. TSA, 665 F.3d 170, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Ultimately, TSA’s decision here
must be vacated either because the agency improperly deviated from its provided prioritization list or because the agency has failed to make a prioritization list that would comport with the mandates of the 2007 Act.”); Dongbu Steel Co. v. United States, 635 F.3d
1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the agency “has failed to adequately explain why
it has interpreted this statutory provision inconsistently”); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA,
526 F.3d 591, 607 (9th Cir. 2008) (invalidating agency interpretation at step two because it
“represents a complete departure from its previous interpretation”); Envtl. Def., Inc. v.
EPA, 509 F.3d 553, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“EPA’s explanation . . . does not address this
inconsistency.”); NSK Ltd. v. United States, 390 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding
agency’s interpretation “internally inconsistent”).
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there may be a problem with its own decisions in the present context.”182
Sometimes, however, the courts take a hard look at the agency’s reasoning
and fault the agency for failing to take into account certain factors.183 Sometimes, moreover, the courts fault the agency for failing to provide a reasoned
decision at all.184
When circuit courts apply the hyperpurposivist approach at Chevron step
two, they focus on ascertaining “congressional intent”185 by looking to the
“purpose”186 or “goal”187 of the statute, including at times whether it is a
“reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”188 To divine purpose
under this approach, the circuit courts often cite legislative history.189 Sometimes courts also invoke a variant of the absurdity doctrine to conclude that
182 Castillo v. Att’y Gen., 729 F.3d 296, 310 (3d Cir. 2013).
183 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d
1172, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (“What was a reasonable balancing of competing statutory priorities twenty years ago may not be a reasonable balancing of those priorities today.”);
Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145, 152–56 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“A statutory interpretation premised in part on either a non-existent factor or one that results from an
unexplained departure from prior Commission policy and practice is not a reasonable
one.”); Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222, 1234 (10th Cir. 2005) (faulting
the agency for failing to consider “other principles, including affordability”); Davis v. EPA,
348 F.3d 772, 783 (9th Cir. 2003) (invalidating agency interpretation that “ignore[s] possible harm to a nonattainment area”); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 738 F.3d 885, 898–99 (8th Cir. 2013) (faulting the agency for failing to explain
how the cases cited provide reasonable grounds for the agency interpretation).
184 See Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 2012) (faulting the agency
because it “entirely fails to explain why” its interpretation is reasonable); Cape Cod Hosp.
v. Sebelius, 630 F.3d 203, 211 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (faulting the agency for “fail[ing] to address
the consultant’s letter when issuing its 2007 final rule”); TNA Merch. Projects, Inc. v.
FERC, 616 F.3d 588, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Thus, although we will defer to a reasonable
definition by the Commission, we cannot defer to one that is unexplained.”); Ctr. for
Energy & Econ. Dev. v. EPA, 398 F.3d 653, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (observing that the “EPA
provides no reason why it signifies the substantive difference EPA presses here”); see also
Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291,
314 (3d Cir. 2013) (faulting the agency “because we cannot discern from the record a
reasoned basis for the agency’s decision”).
185 See, e.g., Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Grp., Inc., 391 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir.
2004); Akhtar v. Burzynski, 384 F.3d 1193, 1199–200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2004).
186 See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding the agency’s
interpretation “was both unexplained and contrary to [the statute’s] purpose, violating the
APA and failing Chevron step two review”).
187 See, e.g., id. at 925 (finding that “the challenged regulation frustrate[s] Congress’s
goal of ‘prohibiting soft money from being used in connection with federal elections’”
(quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 177 n.69 (2003)).
188 Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984)); accord Alvarado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 610
F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010).
189 See, e.g., Ibarra v. Holder, 736 F.3d 903, 912 & n.12 (10th Cir. 2013); Flint Hills Res.
Alaska, LLC v. FERC, 631 F.3d 543, 549–50 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Randolph, J., dissenting);
Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1021–22, 1026 (9th Cir. 2005); Nuclear Energy
Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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the agency’s interpretation would result in “absurd results” compared to Congress’s intended objectives.190
Finally, in the half-dozen instances of hypertextualism or structuralism at
Chevron step two, circuit courts emphasized the overall “statutory scheme”191
or “structure,”192 sometimes assessing the agency interpretation “construed
in conjunction with the language of related statutory and regulatory provisions.”193 This more textualist—though minority—approach to step two
seems quite similar to the Supreme Court’s early approach to Chevron step
two discussed in subsection I.B.1.
III. IMPLICATIONS

OF

STEP-TWO FINDINGS

In this symposium contribution, our purpose is mainly descriptive.
Accordingly, we present our findings without suggesting how courts should,
if at all, alter how they approach step two. But we do offer some thoughts on
our findings.
One should not view our findings as to step two in isolation. A court’s
view or use of step one may affect its view of step two. The more work that a
court can do (or does) at step one means the less work it may need to do at
step two and vice versa. For instance, if textualist judges do not employ their
preferred tools at step one (because, say, ambiguity is obvious), they may be
inclined to use those tools at step two. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
hypertextualist step-two decisions suggested as much. In both Iowa Utilities
Board and Michigan v. EPA, the Justices with a textualist bent who formed the
majority barely referred to (or ignored) step one and thus had no place
other than step two for a textualist inquiry. That said, in Utility Air Regulatory
Group, the textually inclined majority did engage in a significant textual stepone analysis and then continued in step two with more textualism.194 But,
190 See, e.g., Int’l All. of Theatrical & Stage Emps. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (“Besides the internal inconsistency produced by the Board’s reading, the Board’s
reading produces absurd results in individual cases.”); accord Dominion Res., Inc. v. United
States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th
Cir. 2005); see also EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FCC, 704 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding the agency’s interpretation too “capacious”).
191 Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 2006).
192 Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 117 (3d Cir. 2005).
193 Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 254 (3d Cir. 2006); accord Am. Fed’n of Labor &
Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377, 391 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (utilizing a structural or
whole-text approach at step two to strike down an agency statutory interpretation); see also
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA, 472 F.3d 882, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (faulting the
EPA at step two for failing to reconcile its statutory interpretation “with the 1990 Amendments [to the Clean Air Act], which Congress purposefully crafted to limit EPA discretion”), decision clarified on denial of reh’g, 489 F.3d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Am. Fed’n of Labor
& Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying a textualist
approach to step two, though ultimately invoking constitutional avoidance to strike down
the agency statutory interpretation).
194 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439–49 (2014).
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perhaps seeking to bring something new to the Chevron analysis at step two,
the Court introduced the major questions doctrine in the second step.195
Relatedly, our findings do not necessarily reveal circuit judges’ preferences as to how step one or step two should operate. Circuit precedent may
require judges to rely on tools of statutory interpretation for one step that
they would prefer to use in another. For instance, if circuit precedent prohibits judges from considering legislative history196 or certain interpretive
canons as part of step one,197 those judges may use those tools at step two. It
may be that those judges—if they had their way at step one to rely upon
legislative history or certain canons—would prefer a step two that focuses on
reason giving and reasoned decisionmaking. Moreover, regardless of circuit
precedent, we caution that we have only a small number of observations
(fifty-one), and some judges (especially those outside of the D.C. Circuit)
may not encounter meaningful step-two issues often or care to think deeply
about the mechanics of how Chevron functions.
Together, judicial priors and inconsistent circuit precedent that binds
some judges but not others strongly suggest that the Supreme Court has not
been clear as to how each step should work. Although many have focused on
195 See id. at 2446. When more than a bare majority joined an opinion and described
step two (such as in Judulang or Mead), it did not do so in a textual manner. Instead,
perhaps seeking to avoid disagreement over a textual or purposivist step one or step two,
the Court described step two as neither. It was, instead, an inquiry similar to arbitrary-andcapricious review. See id. at 2442.
196 For instance, the Third Circuit has held that courts should not consider legislative
history at step one. See, e.g., United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The
Government is correct that legislative history should not be considered at Chevron step
one.”). That said, a later Third Circuit panel expressed its concern over the reach of this
limitation. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 307 n.8 (3d Cir. 2015) (suggesting that Geiser may only apply to instances in which the language is unambiguous).
Other circuits have indicated their wariness in turning to legislative history at step one.
See, e.g., New Mexico v. Dep’t of Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1227 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e
assume arguendo that an inquiry into legislative history is generally appropriate at Chevron
step one.”); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 654 F.3d 496, 505 (4th Cir.
2011) (“[I]n consulting legislative history at step one of Chevron, we have utilized such
history only for limited purposes, and only after exhausting more reliable tools of construction.”); Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (“This court has
generally been reluctant to employ legislative history at step one of Chevron analysis.”); see
generally John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517,
1521 (2014) (arguing against the use of legislative history at Chevron step one).
197 At least two circuits have indicated that the canon of constitutional avoidance is for
step two, not step one. See, e.g., Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the canon did not apply at step one because it is used only when the statute is
ambiguous); Am. Fed’n of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 179–80
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he constitutional issues raised by the Commission’s disclosure policy
are properly addressed at Chevron step two.”). One of us has taken this argument a step
further, arguing that the modern version of constitutional avoidance should play no role at
Chevron step one or two. See generally Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in
the Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139 (2012).
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the Court’s inconsistent approaches to step one, our findings suggest that the
Court’s inconsistent approaches to step two have, not surprisingly, led to
inconsistent approaches in the courts of appeals. To the extent that the
Court has intended to establish a hypertextualist or arbitrary-and-capricious
approach (the two leading contenders), the circuit courts do not seem to
have gotten the message. They used the former only about 12% of the time
and the latter 33% of the time. Indeed, in more than a quarter of our observations, we could not even categorize the nature of judicial review, and, in
more than a quarter of our observations, the circuit courts used a
hyperpurposivist inquiry, which the Supreme Court has not routinely mentioned. This is not a problem without a remedy. The Supreme Court, with
plenty of theoretical foundation to guide it, should look for ways to bring
coherence to the Chevron framework. To the extent that the Court thinks it
has done so, our results demonstrate otherwise.
Despite the circuit courts’ lack of step-two uniformity, the relatively
strong showing of the arbitrary-and-capricious-review standard (which had a
better showing than other analytical methods) suggests that circuit courts
have better internalized the Supreme Court’s repeated references to that
method than other methods. This should not be surprising once one
notices, based on Figure 1, that the Supreme Court has been suggesting or
outright advocating for such review since 2001. It is likely much easier for
the courts of appeals to discern what the Supreme Court says than what it
does. Accordingly, it becomes less surprising that the courts of appeals
appear to be following what the Supreme Court (mostly) says, not what the
Court (mostly) does in rejecting agency interpretations at Chevron step two.
The divergence between the Supreme Court’s more textualist approach
and the circuit courts’ more purposivist approach is remarkable. The circuit
courts have generally failed to adopt the hypertextualist approach at step two
that the Supreme Court has articulated in a number of cases. Instead, many
circuit courts have pioneered a more purposivist approach—one that is
largely absent at the Supreme Court. That absence may well be due to the
late-Justice Scalia’s outsized textualist influence on the Supreme Court’s
approach to statutory interpretation. As one of us has noted, prior to Justice
Scalia’s passing, the Court, with perhaps Chief Justice Roberts leading the
way, had already begun to embrace a variant of purposivism—perhaps better
labeled “contextualism”—in which the Court seems to prioritize the purpose
or substance of the statute over its text or form.198 Such contextualism has
not reached Chevron step two at the Supreme Court—yet. But we would not
be surprised if the Supreme Court’s trend away from textualism and toward
contextualism also makes its way to step two. If it does, the Court will find
circuit courts quite adept at applying such a new approach, as they have
already been doing so for decades.
198 See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 25, at 36–39; accord Richard M. Re, The New Holy
Trinity, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 407, 421 (2015) (arguing that a number of other opinions from
the Court reveal a more purposivist approach where “legal ambiguity can spring from a
mix of text, purpose, and pragmatism”).
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One final observation is worth making. The Supreme Court’s failure to
provide sufficient guidance on Chevron step two’s domain does not just affect
how lower courts implement the doctrine. It also affects how federal agencies interpret statutes and draft regulations. One of us (Walker) previously
surveyed 128 federal agency rule drafters at seven executive departments
(Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human
Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation) and two
independent agencies (Federal Communications Commission and Federal
Reserve).199 Among more than twenty interpretive tools included in that survey, Chevron deference was the tool reported by the most agency rule drafters
(90%) as being used when interpreting statutes and drafting regulations.200
The vast majority of respondents indicated that they think about judicial
review when interpreting statutes and view their chances of prevailing in
court as better under Chevron. “Indeed, two in five rule drafters surveyed
agreed or strongly agreed—and another two in five somewhat agreed—that a
federal agency is more aggressive in its interpretive efforts if it is confident
that Chevron deference (as opposed to Skidmore deference or de novo review)
applies.”201
Despite the central role of Chevron deference in their statutory interpretation and rule-drafting practices, the agency rule drafters surveyed were all
over the place when asked about whether seventeen interpretive tools should
apply at Chevron steps zero, one, and two. Figure 6 depicts those findings as
to eight interpretive tools that best correspond with the coding of our Chevron step-two cases.202

199 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999
(2015).
200 Id. at 1020 fig.2.
201 Id. at 1063; see also Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An
Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 721–28, 722 fig.3 (2014) (exploring these
findings in greater detail).
202 These findings have not been reported in prior work; they are drawn from Questions 21 and 28 of the survey data, which are on file with the authors. Although the overall
response to the survey was 128 agency rule drafters, the response rate as to these individual
questions varied.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-4\NDL403.txt

1472

unknown

Seq: 32

notre dame law review

30-MAY-18

14:53

[vol. 93:4

FIGURE 6. AGENCY RULE DRAFTERS’ USE OF INTERPRETIVE TOOLS
CHEVRON STEPS

AT

As illustrated in Figure 6, the rule drafters surveyed tended to apply
purposivist tools (purpose/mischief evidence and legislative history) more at
step two than steps zero or one. The same is true for substantive canons,
such as constitutional avoidance and the presumption against preemption.
But none of these findings is definitive, and a fair number of respondents
indicated they did know—ranging from 10% to 44% of the respondents
depending on the interpretive tool. As the Supreme Court considers how to
further define Chevron step two’s domain (and the Chevron doctrine more
generally), it is important to keep in mind that the Court’s instructions will
not only affect how lower courts apply the doctrine, but also how agencies
approach their interpretive duties. Indeed, federal agencies may be the
Supreme Court’s primary audience, at least in terms of the audience who
engages in the most statutory interpretation on a daily basis.203
CONCLUSION
As judges, policymakers, litigants, and scholars continue to debate the
future of Chevron deference, they should not focus only on whether to eliminate Chevron entirely, or on the mechanics or breadth of steps zero and one.
Instead, they should also consider Chevron step two. As Judge Silberman
recently observed, “Chevron’s second step can and should be a meaningful
limitation on the ability of administrative agencies to exploit statutory ambiguities, assert farfetched interpretations, and usurp undelegated policymaking discretion.”204
203 Cf. Christopher J. Walker, Restoring Congress’s Role in the Modern Administrative State,
116 MICH. L. REV. 1101, 1101–02 (2018) (documenting how federal agencies, not Congress, have become the primary lawmakers today).
204 Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J.,
concurring).
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To date, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on Chevron step
two. And the guidance the Court has proffered has been underwhelming
and inconsistent. As detailed in this Article based on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the federal courts of appeals, the circuit courts have
largely ignored the Supreme Court’s more textualist approach to step two,
opting instead for a more purposivist inquiry. At the same time, however, the
circuit courts have embraced the Supreme Court’s more recent emphasis on
arbitrary-and-capricious review at step two. These findings suggest that Chevron step two is fertile ground for more theoretical and doctrinal
development.
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